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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 Would you pay $101,355 for a $23,263 Toyota Camry? If you built 
that car using only Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) parts 
from Toyota, that is how much it would cost.1 Even more shocking, 
the $101,355 would not even include paint or the labor required to 
assemble the vehicle.2 But a recent Illinois case—Avery v. State 
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.3—has effectively mandated 
the use of OEM parts when insurance companies repair damaged 
vehicles.4 
                                                                                                                      
 * Candidate for J.D., Florida State University, 2001; B.A., Oral Roberts University, 
1997. I would like to thank Professor Angela Toman for her instruction and support. I also 
thank Lisa Midkiff, Eric Dickey, Michael Sjuggerud, and the Law Review staff for their 
assistance. This Note is dedicated to Karen Rearden, my mother, for her endless 
encouragement, love, and guidance. 
 1. See Press Release, Alliance of Am. Insurers, Rebuilt Camry Costs 4x Retail Price, 
Proving OEM Auto Parts Are $7.2 Billion Rip-Off, Alliance Study Finds (July 30, 1999) 
[hereinafter AAI, Rebuilt Camry]. 
 2. See id. 
 3. No. 97-L-114, (Ill. Cir. Ct. Oct. 8, 1999), available in WESTLAW, 1999 WL 955543 
(Count I); No. 97-L-114, 1999 WL 1022134 (Count II), appeal docketed, No. 5-99-0830 (Ill. 
App. Ct. Dec. 21, 1999), and motion for direct appeal denied, No. 88833. Count I pertained 
to plaintiffs’ breach of contract action. See 1999 WL 955543, at *1. Counts II and III 
addressed plaintiffs’ claims under an Illinois consumer fraud and deceptive business 
practices statute. See 1999 WL 1022134, at *1. 
 4. See 1999 WL 1022134, at *5.  
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 Not suprisingly, Avery has sent shock waves through the 
automobile insurance community and could cause the amount of 
insurance premiums to skyrocket. As one journalist noted:  
The stakes in this battle are enormous, given the estimated 35 
million automobile accidents that occur in the U.S. each year. The 
crash parts used to repair wrecked vehicles cost about $9 billion, 
money that is paid largely by insurers and financed by the 
premiums paid by all motorists.5  
 This Note will first analyze the potentially groundbreaking case of 
Avery before discussing its ramifications for automobile insurance 
companies and their policyholders. Avery has engendered an 
important debate regarding the use of non-Original Equipment 
Manufacturer parts (non-OEM), and it may lead to significant 
premium increases for the insurance-consuming public. This Note 
will analyze the issues associated with the use of non-OEM parts, 
and upon reaching the conclusion that their use should be retained, 
it will offer a possible solution to the problem that can be 
implemented extrajudicially and within the existing legislative 
scheme by the insurers themselves. In the event that the insurers 
choose not to implement the proposed solution, the Florida 
Legislature should consider mandating the proposed solution. 
II.   AVERY V. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE CO. 
 The plaintiffs in Avery were State Farm policyholders who 
claimed that by repairing their wrecked vehicles with non-OEM 
automobile parts rather than using OEM parts, State Farm failed to 
return their cars to “pre-loss condition” as required by their 
insurance policies.6 On October 4, 1999, the jury rendered a verdict 
in favor of the plaintiffs, finding that State Farm breached its 
contracts with the plaintiffs, and the jury awarded the plaintiffs $456 
million.7 In addition, the trial court awarded the plaintiffs $130 
million—the amount of direct savings that State Farm realized from 
its practice of using non-OEM parts.8 The trial court also awarded 
the plaintiffs $600 million in punitive damages for violation of the 
Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act.9 
Totaling almost $1.2 billion, the judgment in Avery is reportedly the 
                                                                                                                      
 5. See Ralph Vartabedian, Losers in State Farm Case May Be Consumers, L.A. 
TIMES, Oct. 21, 1999, at W1, 1999 WL 26187710. 
 6. See Avery, 1999 WL 1022134, at *1. See infra notes 92-94 and accompanying text 
for an in-depth discussion of the difference between OEM and non-OEM parts. 
 7. See 1999 WL 955543, at *1. 
 8. See 1999 WL 1022134, at *4.  
 9. See id.; see also 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/1-12 (West 1997). 
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largest judgment ever against an insurance company in the United 
States.10 
 State Farm filed a notice of appeal to the Illinois Appellate 
Court.11 In addition, State Farm filed a motion for direct appeal to 
the Illinois Supreme Court, requesting the state supreme court to 
bypass the intermediate appellate court.12 The Illinois Supreme 
Court denied State Farm’s motion for direct appeal.13 Consequently, 
the case remains on appeal at the Illinois Appellate Court. 
 The plaintiffs benefited from a number of the trial court’s 
generous rulings. Foremost was the trial court’s decision to certify 
the plaintiff class as comprised of the following members: 
 All persons in the United States, except those residing in 
Arkansas and Tennessee, who, between July 28, 1994, and 
February 24, 1998, (1) were insured by a vehicle casualty 
insurance policy issued by Defendant State Farm and (2) made a 
claim for vehicle repairs pursuant to their policy and had non-
factory authorized and/or non-OEM (Original Equipment 
Manufacturer) “crash parts” installed on their vehicles or else 
received monetary compensation determined in relation to the cost 
of such parts. Excluded from the class are employees of Defendant 
State Farm, its officers, its directors, its subsidiaries, or its 
affiliates. 
 In addition, the following persons are excluded from the class: 
(1) persons who resided or garaged their vehicles in Illinois and 
whose Illinois insurance policies were issued/executed prior to 
April 16, 1994, and (2) persons who resided in California and 
whose policies were issued/executed prior to September 26, 1996.14 
As a result of the court’s decision to certify the plaintiff class, the 
plaintiffs did not have to show that each individual class member 
suffered harm.15 The plaintiffs were “not required to prove which 
members of the class suffered an economic loss or the extent of any 
individual’s loss.”16 Nor were plaintiffs required to prove the preloss 
condition of any individual vehicle or that any specific non-OEM part 
was of lesser quality.17 Based on these rulings, it was highly probable 
                                                                                                                      
 10. See Memorandum of State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. at 1, Avery v. State Farm 
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 88853 (Ill. Feb. 24, 2000). This brief was filed in support of State 
Farm’s motion for direct appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court. The motion was denied. 
 11. See Notice of Appeal, Avery v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 97-L-114, (Ill. 
App. Ct. Oct. 8, 1999) The appeal was filed on December 7, 1999, with the Fifth District 
Appellate Court. 
 12. See Motion of State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. for Direct Appeal, Avery v. State Farm 
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 88853 (Ill. Feb. 24, 2000). The motion was filed January 20, 2000. 
 13. See Avery v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 88853 (Ill. Feb. 24, 2000). 
 14. Avery, 1999 WL 1022134, at *1, *2. 
 15. See Memorandum of State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. at 16, Avery (No. 88853). 
 16. Id.  
 17. See id.  
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that some members of the class would recover without any showing 
of loss. 
 Prohibiting State Farm from informing the jury that its 
policyholder group owned the company likely impacted the jury’s 
decision as well.18 Although the plaintiffs were permitted to suggest 
that State Farm was motivated by greed, the court prohibited State 
Farm from refuting their suggestion by showing that the 
policyholders owned the company and benefited from its financial 
success.19 In addition, the trial court barred insurance regulators 
from testifying on behalf of State Farm concerning debates in state 
legislatures about the quality of non-OEM parts.20 Reportedly, jurors 
were also not allowed to hear “any of the evidence about the benefits 
of auto part competition.”21 
 The trial court precluded State Farm’s damages expert from 
testifying.22 Thus, the plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Iqbal Mathur, offered the 
only expert testimony jurors heard.23 Dr. Mathur asserted two 
theories for measuring damages: a “specification” theory and an 
“installation” theory.24 Under the “specification” theory, the insured 
suffered damages if a non-OEM part was specified on the repair 
estimate, even if non-OEM parts were not installed on the vehicle. 
Yet, upon cross-examination, Dr. Mathur conceded that this theory 
made “no economic sense.”25 Under the “installation” theory, those 
insureds who had non-OEM parts installed on their vehicles were 
further entitled to “installation” damages.26 Dr. Mathur found that 
damages could be anywhere between $658,450,000 and 
$1,211,500,000, yet he conceded that “his estimate could be too high 
by as much as $1 billion.”27 
 In its brief requesting the Illinois Supreme Court to bypass the 
usual appellate process by directly considering the appeal, State 
Farm expressed concern there would be a significant adverse effect 
on insurance consumers “if insurance companies stop[ped] specifying 
non-OEM repair parts.”28 Furthermore, the brief addressed three 
main issues it alleged would warrant direct review by the Illinois 
                                                                                                                      
 18. See Memorandum of State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. at 17, Avery (No. 88853). 
 19. See id.  
 20. See id. 
 21. David Reich-Hale, When Car Costs Less Than Sum of Its Parts, Auto Competition 
Is Critical, Insurers Contend, NAT’L UNDERWRITER (PROPRTY & CASUALTY), Jan. 3, 2000, at 
3, 3. 
 22. See Memorandum of State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. at 18, Avery (No. 88853). 
 23. See id. 
 24. See id. 
 25. See id. at 18. 
 26. See id. at 19. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 5. 
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Supreme Court: (1) the class should not have been certified, (2) the 
punitive damages award should not have been awarded, and (3) 
direct review is in the public’s best interest.29 But in denying review, 
the Illinois Supreme Court simply stated “Motion by appellant for 
direct appeal to this Court pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 302(b). 
Motion Denied.”30 This decision was a surprising move by the state 
supreme court, since the amount of money involved will certainly 
lead the losing party at the appellate level to file an appeal with the 
Illinois Supreme Court. 
 State Farm fears that southern Illinois will become a magnet for 
similar class action lawsuits.31 This fear is supported by several 
similar lawsuits that have already been filed against automobile 
insurers in the wake of the Avery decision. Indeed, the same group of 
lawyers that represented the Avery plaintiffs has filed similar 
lawsuits against other insurers in the same county where Avery was 
decided.32  
 The first of these, Paul v. Country Mutual Insurance Co.,33 alleged 
that the insurance companies engaged in a “uniform and common 
practice of using inferior, imitation crash parts in the repair of their 
policyholder’s vehicle.”34 The second case, Hobbs v. State Farm 
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,35 was filed less than one month 
after the Avery decision. The plaintiffs in Hobbs named a number of 
automobile insurers as defendants including State Farm, CNA, 
Allstate, Safeco, Liberty Mutual, USAA, and GEICO. These plaintiffs 
contended that the insurers: 
knowingly specified inferior non-OEM crash parts, falsely claimed 
that these non-OEM crash parts were of like kind and quality, and 
jointly founded and financed the Certified Auto Parts Association 
(“CAPA”) as a front to conceal their conduct and to deceive 
policyholders into believing that parts of like kind and quality to 
OEM parts were being used to satisfy policyholder claims.36 
The plaintiffs are again seeking class action status.37 David Snyder, 
Assistant General Counsel for the American Insurance Association, 
recently summed up the decision by stating, “the filing of the Hobbs 
                                                                                                                      
 29. See id. 21, 28, 31. 
 30. Avery v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 88853 (Ill. Feb. 24, 2000). 
 31. See Memorandum of State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. at 33-34, Avery (No. 88853). 
 32. See id. at 7.  
 33. No. 99-L-995 (Ill. Cir. Ct.). The complaint was filed October 13, 1999. 
 34. Complaint at 1, Paul (No. 99-L-995).  
 35. No. 99-L-1068 (Ill. Cir. Ct.). The complaint was filed Nov. 2, 1999.  
 36. Complaint at 1, Hobbs (No. 99-L-1068); see also infra notes 95-99 and 
accompanying text for further discussion of CAPA. 
 37. See Complaint at 8, Hobbs (No. 99-L-1068). 
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lawsuit is evidence that this litigation will have the effect of creating 
a monopoly in what is now a competitive parts industry.”38 
 The significant impact of the Avery decision has extended beyond 
the borders of the United States and into Canada.39 As of January 3, 
2000, a “class action style lawsuit [had] been filed in Quebec against 
Group Desjardins, ING Canada (the second largest auto insurer in 
Canada) and AXA Canada (seventh largest) relating to their use of 
non-OE[M] parts.”40 Two American insurance companies that sell 
automobile insurance in Canada, State Farm and Liberty Mutual, 
have ceased using non-OEM parts on vehicles repaired in Ontario, 
Canada.41 Furthermore, trade associations are petitioning Transport 
Canada to prohibit the importation of non-OEM parts, some of which 
come from American companies.42 
 State Farm, Country Companies, and Nationwide have recently 
ceased repairing wrecked vehicles with non-OEM parts.43 
Nationwide’s decision also extended to its Nationwide affiliates: 
Allied, Farmland, and Scottsdale Insurance Companies.44 A 
Nationwide representative issuing the non-OEM decision said this 
was made in response to the “current environment surrounding non-
OEM crash parts.”45 As a result, during the first month of the 
suspension of non-OEM parts, State Farm has incurred costs of $4.8 
million more than expected to repair insured vehicles.46 
 In contrast, several other major insurers including Allstate, 
Farmers, Progressive, USAA, Travelers, SAFECO and Hartford 
continue to use non-OEM parts in the wake of Avery.47 According to 
an Allstate representative, Allstate will continue to use non-OEM 
parts “where appropriate.”48 USAA recently reviewed its policy 
surrounding non-OEM parts, but the company contends that this is 
not in response to the Avery trial or decision.49 
  Avery has reached into U.S. financial markets as well. The stock 
price of Keystone Automotive Industries, Inc., the largest non-OEM 
                                                                                                                      
 38. Curtis Anderson, Seven Auto Insurers Named in Illinois Aftermarket Parts Suit, 
CLAIMS, Dec. 1999, at 12, 12. 
 39. See Aftermarket Parts Lawsuits Hit Canada, COLLISIONWEEK (Quandec Corp.), 
Jan. 3, 2000, http://www.collisionweek.com (visited Oct. 16, 2000). 
 40. Id. 
 41. See id. 
 42. See id.  
 43. See Nationwide Insurance Suspends Use of Non-OEM Crash Parts, at 
http://www.insure.com/auto/collision/nationwide1199.html (last modified Nov. 5, 1999). 
 44. See id. 
 45. Id.  
 46. See Memorandum of State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. at 5, Avery (No. 88853). 
 47. See Joe Frey, Is the State Farm Verdict Enough To Change Industry Practice?, at 
http://www.insure.com/auto/collision/statefarmup10994.html (visited Mar. 29, 2000). 
 48. Id.  
 49. See id. 
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parts distributor in the U.S., was $21.63 in January 1999.50 That 
price fell to $10.88 per share during the course of the trial as 
investors got cold feet, then dropped to $8.50 the day following the 
decision.51 In October, 2000, the price of Keystone stock bottomed out 
at $4.56 per share.52 As of January 23, 2001, the stock had risen to 
$8.00 per share.53 If this trend continues, many non-OEM parts 
manufacturers may be driven out of business. If that occurs, 
consumers will end up in the same situation that they were in during 
the 1970s, when automobile manufacturers monopolized repair 
parts.54 
 What plaintiffs’ attorneys are hailing as a victory for consumers 
may ultimately be the sole reason for an increase in automobile 
insurance rates.55 In discussing what consumers should expect rates 
to be in the future, Robert Hurns, an analyst with the National 
Association of Independent Insurers, recently stated, “[Y]ou will end 
up paying higher premiums.”56 Insurance companies use non-OEM 
parts to minimize insurance costs. Their rationale is based on simple 
economic principles: reduce costs and pass those savings on to 
consumers. 
 Other insurance industry analysts believe that if the Avery verdict 
is upheld, there will be little, if any, effect on future insurance rates. 
One such analyst predicted that insurance policyholders with State 
Farm would see only a 1% increase in their insurance rates as a 
result of Avery.57 This assertion is made in part because the appeal 
may overturn the verdict or will at least delay payment. The 
assertion also takes into account the time required for the insurance 
companies to file rate increases with each state insurance 
department, further delaying the effects of any automobile rate 
hikes.58 
                                                                                                                      
 50. See Joseph Ascenzi, State Farm Auto Parts Dispute Dings Manufacturer, BUS. 
PRESS, Oct. 18, 1999, at 2, 1999 WL 7171730. 
 51. See id. 
 52. See Search of Nasdaq Index Quotes, http://quotes.nasdaq.com (select “charting”; 
enter “KEYS”in ADD A SECURITY FIELD; select appropriate interval; click on chart). 
Keystone had not suffered any major business setbacks, so it seems likely that the drop 
was a result of concern after the Avery decision. See Joseph Ascenzi, After-Market Auto 
Parts To Bear Keystone Brand: Earnings Drop 79% After Court Orders Repair Shops To 
Use Manufacturer Parts, BUS. PRESS, Nov. 20, 2000, at 1, 2000 WL 7814823. 
 53.  See Search of Nasdaq Index Quotes, supra note 52. 
 54. See ALLIANCE OF AM. INSURERS, AUTO MANUFACTURERS WANT A MONOPOLY ON 
REPLACEMENT CAR PARTS (1999) [hereinafter AAI, MONOPOLY]. 
 55. See Matthew L. Wald, Consumers May Be Losers in a Verdict on Auto Parts, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 17, 1999, at C1. 
 56. Id. 
 57. See Joe Frey, Higher Auto Premiums Because of State Farm Verdict? Think Again , 
at http://www.insure.com/auto/collision/statefarmup10992.html (last modified Oct. 6, 
1999). 
 58. See id. 
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 Recently the Insurance Information Institute (I.I.I.) released 
figures that indicate Avery has had an effect on the insurance 
industry.59 An increase of 1.5% occurred in 2000, which is the first 
increase in three years.60 The increase for 2001 is expected to be 
between 2% and 4%.61 These figures show a significant change as 
1998 and 1999 experienced rate decreases for the first time since 
1973.62 Dr. Robert P. Hartwig, I.I.I. Vice President and Chief 
Economist, stated that “[t]he effective prohibition on the use of 
generic parts of like kind and quality in the repair of damaged 
vehicles [as a result of Avery] is a factor that could ultimately add $4 
to $5 billion annually to the cost of automobile insurance.”63 
III.   RELATED CASES 
 The Avery decision is a drastic shift in how courts traditionally 
view the use of non-OEM parts. A survey of cases across the United 
States shows that cases similar to Avery have either been dismissed 
or have been decided in favor of the insurance-company defendants.  
 Arizona.—An Arizona Superior Court dismissed a similar case 
after the Avery decision. In Kenger v. Government Employees 
Insurance Co.,64 Judge Norman Davis ruled that Mr. Kenger did not 
prove that the radiator installed in his Honda was inferior or that he 
suffered damage.65  
 Florida.—A trial court in Florida dismissed a similar case, which 
the Florida Third District Court of Appeal affirmed in April of 1999. 66 
The appellate court stated, “The economic loss rule bars causes of 
actions in tort between parties to a contract unless there is proof of 
personal injury or property damage independent of a breach of the 
contract.”67 The trial court found no economic loss or breach of 
contract, prompting the dismissal of the plaintiff’s claim.68 
 Massachusetts.—A Superior Court in Norfolk County granted 
partial summary judgment to the defendant insurance company on a 
diminished value claim.69 The court found nothing in the insurance 
                                                                                                                      
 59. See Press Release, Insurance Info. Inst., Auto Insurance Rates Expected to Rise, 
Court Decision and Litigation End Recent Declines, I.I.I. Reports (Dec. 4, 2000), 
http://www.iii.org (visited Jan. 10, 2001). 
 60. See id. 
 61. See id.  
 62. See id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. No. CV9901522 (Ariz. Super. Ct. Feb. 18, 2000). 
 65. See id.  
 66. See Clayton v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 729 So. 2d 1012, 1013 (Fla. 3d DCA 
1999). 
 67. Id. 
 68. See id. 
 69. See Roth v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co., No. 98-3551, slip op. at 3 (Mass. Super. Ct. Sept. 
3, 1999).  
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policy that precluded the use of non-OEM parts. Additionally, in 
denying a second motion for summary judgment, the court stated, 
“statutes and regulations in the Commonwealth mandate such usage, 
no doubt to reduce costs of repair and consequently, premium costs to 
consumers.”70 The court denied the insurance company’s summary 
judgment motion, acknowledging that there was an issue of material 
fact regarding the quality of the non-OEM fender in question.71 
 Pennsylvania.—The Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia 
County also sustained an insurance company’s preliminary objection 
to the plaintiffs’ class action complaint.72 The insurance company 
“disput[ed] that any contractual duty was owed to the plaintiff to pay 
for that automobile’s diminished value.”73 According to the court, 
“Pennsylvania follows the reasonable expectation doctrine in 
determining the scope of an insurance contract.”74 The court reasoned 
that plaintiffs’ “expectations are not reasonable in light of the current 
common practice in Pennsylvania.”75 Hence, the court dismissed the 
class action complaint with prejudice.76  
 Tennessee.—In Murray v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Co.,77 the 
United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee 
denied the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification.78 The court cited 
two reasons. First, common questions of fact and law did not exist.79 
Second, the court stated that there were potential conflicts among 
the class representatives that might not be resolvable.80 As a result, 
State Farm policyholders in Tennessee were not a part of the Avery 
class action suit.81 The plaintiffs did not appeal the denial of class 
certification.82 
 Texas.—The plaintiffs in Berry v. State Farm Mutual Automobile 
Insurance Co.83 made essentially the same allegations as the Avery 
plaintiffs. Although the court granted summary judgment in favor of 
the insurance companies, the insureds had abandoned their breach of 
                                                                                                                      
 70. Roth v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co., No. 98-3551, slip. op. at 4 (Mass. Super. Ct. July 31, 
2000).  
 71. See id.  
 72. See Munoz v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 9906-2855, slip. op. at 1 (Pa. C.P. Ct. Nov. 23, 
1999). 
 73. Id. at 2. 
 74. Id. at 3. 
 75. Id. at 4.  
 76. See id. at 6. 
 77. No. 96-2585 Ml/A, slip op. (W.D. Tenn. Aug. 19, 1997). 
 78. Id. at 1. 
 79. See id. at 15 (holding that there could not be common questions of fact because the 
determination of inferiority of non-OEM parts “would require the testing of thousands of 
individual crash parts”). 
 80. See id. at 20. 
 81. See Memorandum of State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. at 12, Avery (No. 88853). 
 82. See id. 
 83. 9 S.W.3d 884 (Tex. App. 2000). 
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contract claims.84 Instead, the court decided that the insurance 
companies were not required “to pay for the new OEM parts in the 
satisfaction of all legitimate claims.”85 The court held that “like kind 
and quality” parts do not necessarily have to be OEM parts.86 The 
court stated, “[W]e cannot say as a matter of law that all non-OEM 
parts are substandard and that insurers must pay for new OEM 
parts in every claim, regardless of the age or condition of the covered 
vehicle prior to the accident or the quality of available non-OEM 
parts.”87 
IV.   THE DEBATE: OEM VS. NON-OEM 
 The trial court’s decision in Avery was based on the plaintiffs’ 
claim that “non-OEM parts are generally inferior to OEM parts” and 
that “State Farm had breached its ‘promise to the class’” to restore 
the vehicles to their preloss condition.88 But the plaintiffs conceded at 
trial that they “could not prove that all non-OEM [parts] were 
inferior.”89 In turn, State Farm argued that the plaintiffs’ concession 
showed that the trial court must determine on a case-by-case basis 
whether use of non-OEM parts restored each vehicle to its preloss 
condition.90 Rejecting this argument, the trial court spawned further 
debate regarding OEM and non-OEM parts.91 Hence, it is important 
to determine whether the OEM parts are actually superior to non-
OEM parts before deciding whether the plaintiffs’ arguments in 
Avery are valid. In determining whether one class of parts is superior 
overall, issues of safety, warranty, price, and competition must be 
thoroughly examined. 
A.   Differences Between Non-OEM and OEM Parts 
 The key difference between an OEM part and a non-OEM part is 
the distributor of the part. The automobile manufacturer distributes 
OEM parts. For example, Ford Motor Company distributes OEM 
Ford parts. A manufacturer other than Ford, such as Keystone 
Automotive, may distribute the non-OEM parts for Ford vehicles. 
Most automobile manufacturers do not actually fabricate the OEM 
parts themselves.92 Instead, they subcontract with independent 
                                                                                                                      
 84. See id. at 888. 
 85. Id. at 894. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Memorandum of State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. at 15, Avery (No. 88853). 
 89. Id.  
 90. See id.  
 91. See id. at 16. 
 92. See ALLIANCE OF AM. INSURERS, CLAIMS BULLETIN NO. 99-9, SUBJECT: AFTER 
MARKET PARTS (1999) (on file with author) [hereinafter, AAI, CLAIMS BULLETIN]. 
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manufacturers for the fabrication of OEM parts, affixing “genuine 
part” labels to them.93 Some of the same subcontractors that 
manufacture OEM parts also manufacture non-OEM parts!94 
 Not only is there a distinction, however superficial, between OEM 
and non-OEM parts, there is also a distinction among non-OEM 
parts. The Certified Automotive Parts Association (CAPA) is an 
independent organization that certifies certain non-OEM parts that 
meet specified criteria. CAPA was “established in 1987 to develop 
and oversee a test program guaranteeing the suitability and quality 
of automotive parts.”95 The yellow CAPA seal on a non-OEM part 
signifies that the part is certified to “meet or exceed CAPA Quality 
Standards for fit, materials, and corrosion resistance.”96 CAPA’s part 
certification program includes manufacturer facility approval, 
individual part certification, and random inspections of both facilities 
and parts to ensure part quality.97 Since 1992, CAPA has used the 
same laboratories as car manufacturers use to test their parts in 
order to prove that CAPA-certified parts are of the same quality as 
OEM parts.98 CAPA-certified parts account for only 3% of the crash-
parts sold today while their market share is steadily growing.99 
B.   Safety 
 Most OEM proponents have taken the position that non-OEM 
parts compromise vehicle safety.100 However, two separate studies by 
the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS) found that non-
OEM parts do not affect vehicle safety.101 During one study, IIHS 
stripped a 1997 Toyota Camry of its cosmetic parts (fenders, door 
skins, and front bumper) and installed a certified non-OEM hood.102 
IIHS then performed a forty mile per hour frontal impact crash test, 
which yielded positive results.103 Thus, IIHS concluded that a Camry 
without the installation of cosmetic parts was as crashworthy as a 
                                                                                                                      
 93. See id.  
 94. See id. 
 95. Certified Automotive Parts Association (Homepage), at http://www.capacertified. 
com (visited Oct. 16, 2000). 
 96. CAPA Overview, at http://www.capacertified.com/about.html (visited Mar. 5, 
2001). 
 97. See id. 
 98. See AAI, MONOPOLY, supra note 54. 
 99. See Cheap Car Parts Can Cost You a Bundle, CONSUMER REPORTS, Feb. 1999, at 
15 [hereinafter Cheap Car Parts]. 
 100. See id. at 2. 
 101. See INSURANCE INST. FOR HIGHWAY SAFETY, STATUS REPORT: COSMETIC REPAIR 
PARTS IRRELEVANT TO SAFETY, 1-6 (2000), available at http://www.highwaysafety.org/ 
sr.htm (last modified Jan. 5, 2001).  
 102. See id.  
 103. See id. 
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fully equipped Camry with OEM parts.104 An industry spokesperson 
reassured that “[t]he cosmetic parts didn’t influence the results.”105  
 In the other study, which was performed several years earlier, 
IIHS performed a thirty mile per hour front-into-barrier crash test on 
a 1987 Ford Escort equipped with a competitive replacement hood.106 
The crash-tested car “met and far exceeded all federal 
requirements.”107 Specialists at IIHS stated that because the car 
withstood the crash without the installation of cosmetic parts, the 
parts were “irrelevant to meeting federal safety requirements.”108 
C.   Warranty Issues 
 Some opponents of non-OEM parts also argue that the use of non-
OEM parts to repair a vehicle voids the manufacturer’s original 
warranty.109 This claim is without merit as the federal Magnuson-
Moss Warrant Act110 ensures that the use of non-OEM parts 
generally does not void the warranty on the remaining parts.111 When 
considering the Magnuson-Moss Act, legislators specifically 
addressed automobile parts. House Report 93-1107 states, “Under 
this prohibition . . . no automobile manufacturer may condition his 
warranty of an automobile . . . on the use of its own automobile parts 
unless he shows that any other . . . automobile parts which are 
available . . . will not give equivalent performance characteristics in 
the automobile.”112 Consumers are further protected because most 
insurance companies offer lifetime warranties for non-OEM parts 
used to repair their vehicles. For example, State Farm and GEICO 
guarantee non-OEM parts for as long as the insured owns the 
vehicle.113 
 The above discussion suggests that the answer to the debate 
regarding whether to use OEM or non-OEM parts is to use both. In 
other words, insurers should be allowed to continue using non-OEM 
parts to repair damaged automobiles. Consumers apparently reached 
the same conclusion on their own. Because Indiana law requires 
consent to use non-OEM parts in repairing vehicles, State Farm 
                                                                                                                      
 104. See id. 
 105. Id. at 2. 
 106. See id. at 4. 
 107. Alliance of Am. Insurers, Test Shows Cosmetic Parts Do Not Affect Safety 
Compliance (1999) (promotional material, on file with author). 
 108. Id. 
 109. See AAI, MONOPOLY, supra note 54. 
 110. See 15 U.S.C. § 2302(c) (1994); see also AAI, MONOPOLY, supra note 54. 
 111. See AAI, MONOPOLY, supra note 54. 
 112. H.R. Rep. No. 93-1107, at 36, 37 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7702, 
7719. 
 113. See What Is an Aftermarket Part?, at http://www.geico.com/infocenter/faqframeset. 
htm (visited Mar. 27, 2000). 
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conducted a study which found that 93.2% of policyholders consented 
to using non-OEM parts on their vehicles.114 Additionally, in a survey 
of 1400 State Farm claim files involving estimates with non-OEM 
parts, only .59% of policyholders complained.115 Such figures suggest 
that both consumers and insurance companies recognize the benefits 
of non-OEM parts. 
D.   Price 
 1.   Parts 
 Whether CAPA-approved or not, non-OEM parts are significantly 
less expensive than OEM parts. The Alliance for American Insurers 
(AAI) concluded that OEM parts are on average 60% more expensive 
than their certified non-OEM counterparts.116 Appendix A illustrates 
the difference between the prices of OEM parts and non-OEM parts 
for several makes of automobiles.117 
 According to Appendix A, OEM parts are consistently more 
expensive than similar non-OEM parts. In a few instances, the price 
of an OEM part is three times that of a non-OEM part.118 Appendix A 
shows that the average cost of an OEM bumper was 43.6% higher 
than a non-OEM bumper. The OEM hoods were 63.5% more costly 
than non-OEM hoods, and the OEM fenders were 88.3% more 
expensive than their non-OEM counterparts. These types of 
increased part costs caused State Farm some $4.8 million in losses in 
the month following Avery.119 If this trend of using only OEM parts 
continues, the heightened cost “will inevitably be passed on to 
consumers in the form of higher insurance premiums.”120 
 If Appendix A were to compare the total cost of a vehicle in 
relation to each individual part, the cost gap would further widen. An 
AAI study found that purchasing each of the OEM parts required to 
assemble a 1999 Toyota Camry would cost over $101,355.121 This 
figure does not include the cost of assembling the parts or painting 
the car.122 When considering that the retail price of this car is only 
                                                                                                                      
 114. See State Farm Indiana Policyholders Choose Non-OEM Crash Parts, at 
http://www.statefarm.com/insuranc/auto/trialpc.htm (visited Oct. 16. 2000).  
 115. See Policyholder Complaint Rates with Repairs Involving Non-OEM Crash Parts, 
at http://www.statefarm.com/insuranc/auto/trialpcr.htm (visited Oct. 16, 2000). 
 116. See AAI, CLAIMS BULLETIN, supra note 92. 
 117. See infra App. A.  
 118. Note the differences in price between the Chrysler Cirrus and Honda Accord 
fenders and non-OEM fenders. 
 119. See Memorandum of State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. at 5, Avery (No. 88853). 
 120. Id. 
 121. See AAI, Rebuilt Camry, supra note 1. 
 122. See id.  
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$23,263,123 one may easily conclude that OEM parts are extremely 
overpriced. 
 Insurance companies use non-OEM parts for several reasons. The 
most important reason, however, is that non-OEM parts keep costs 
down, which in turn keeps insurance premiums down.124 State Farm, 
a mutual insurance company owned by its policyholders, has 
traditionally passed these savings along to its customers in the form 
of reimbursements.125 It is estimated “that insurance companies are 
able to reduce repair costs by approximately $800 million a year by 
specifying less expensive non-OEM parts.”126 Although the judge in 
Avery did not admit these estimated savings figures as evidence, 
State Farm was prepared to show the jury that during the period of 
1987 to 1997, it was able to save its policyholders millions of dollars 
as a result of non-OEM parts use.127 Here are the figures: 
 
         MILLIONS OF DOLLARS SAVED 
    YEAR    BY THE USE OF NON-OEM PARTS128 
 
    1987         $54.7 
    1988         $65.2 
    1989         $77.5 
    1990         $90.3 
    1991       $107.9 
    1992       $139.3 
    1993       $150.3 
    1994       $190.1 
    1995       $206.1 
    1996       $226.8 
    1997       $233.6 
 
 Such savings can only help to foster stabilization of automobile 
repair costs and insurance rates.129 There is currently only one 
known insurance company, the Interinsurance Exchange of the 
                                                                                                                      
 123. See id.  
 124. See E-mail from Bernadette Baltakis, Internet Rep., Progressive Casualty Ins. 
Co., to Matthew Rearden (Feb. 9, 2000) (on file with author) (“The availability of quality 
non-OEM parts encourages competition among parts manufacturers and suppliers and 
drives down the cost of auto repairs. When competition is eliminated, prices rise.”).  
 125. See Memorandum of State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. at 17, Avery (No. 88853). 
 126. Id. at 5. 
 127. See Premiums Saved by State Farm Mutual Policyholders as a Result of the 
Introduction of Competitively Priced Auto Crash Parts, at http://www.statefarm.com/ 
insuranc/auto/trialps.htm (visited Mar. 31, 2000). 
 128. See id.  
 129. See Press Release, National Ass’n of Indep. Insurers, Class Action Lawsuit Battle 
over Replacement Parts Expands According to the National Association of Independent 
Insurers (Nov. 3, 1999) (on file with author). 
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Automobile Club of Southern California, that uses only OEM parts to 
repair its insureds’ vehicles.130 Prior to the Avery decision, at least 
five other insurance companies (Allstate, Erie, Farmers, State Farm, 
and USAA) recommended, but did not require, the use of non-OEM 
parts.131 
2.   Installation 
 On the other hand, non-OEM parts may require more installation 
time than their OEM counterparts. A recent study by Frost & 
Sullivan, an independent marketing firm, found that 89% of repair 
shops responded that “it takes about two hours longer to install an 
imitation part, costing $60 to $90 extra in labor.”132 Improper fit of 
the non-OEM parts may cause the longer installation times. At a 
recent demonstration at the Collision Industry Conference (CIC), “a 
CAPA hood and fender . . . didn’t fit properly on an undamaged 1994 
Toyota Camry . . . .”133 CAPA decertified the fender just days before 
the conference and decertified the hood on the spot.134 However, three 
months later at another CIC demonstration all of the CAPA and non-
CAPA parts fit correctly.135 At any rate, to the extent that non-OEM 
parts require longer installation, this extra cost would offset some of 
the savings from the lower cost of the parts. 
E.   Competition 
 One must also weigh the costs of non-OEM installation delay 
against the market benefits. Prior to the mid-1970s, automobile 
manufacturers monopolized the replacement parts market.136 Before 
the introduction of non-OEM parts, automobile companies enjoyed up 
to an 800% mark-up on OEM parts sales.137 “Henry Ford is reputed to 
have said he’d give his cars away if he could have a monopoly on 
selling replacement parts.”138 Indeed, OEM prices decreased after 
non-OEM parts introduced competition into the market.139 Appendix 
                                                                                                                      
 130. See Cheap Car Parts, supra note 99, at 19. 
 131. See id. at 18-19.  
 132. Id. at 17. 
 133. Id. at 16. 
 134. See id.  
 135. See id. at 16-17. 
 136. See AAI, MONOPOLY, supra note 54. 
 137. See ALLIANCE OF AM. INSURERS, COMPARISON OF CURRENT COSTS: OEM V. 
COMPETITIVE REPLACEMENT PARTS (1999) [hereinafter AAI, CURRENT COSTS] (on file with 
author). 
 138. Id. at 16. 
 139. See ALLIANCE OF AM. INSURERS, COST HISTORY COMPARISON: OEM V. 
COMPETITIVE REPLACEMENT PARTS (1999) [hereinafter AAI, COST HISTORY] (on file with 
author). 
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B numerically demonstrates how non-OEM parts competition has 
driven down the cost of OEM parts.140 
 In addition, non-OEM parts ensure better products and prices 
through competition. Most advocates of these parts assert that 
“allowing competition in the production of crash parts actually helps 
ensure quality and safety. Competition forces each individual 
company to produce quality parts at a fair market price.”141 Thus, not 
only does using non-OEM parts offer short-term cost savings over 
OEM parts but, by supporting the market in non-OEM parts it keeps 
down OEM prices, too. 
 V.   SOLUTION: GIVE CONSUMERS A CHOICE 
 How might insurers craft policies to allow use of both OEM parts 
and non-OEM parts—without subjecting themselves to expensive 
litigation? The answer is the development of a two-tiered approach to 
insurance policies in an area where, traditionally, “there has not 
been much of an appetite.”142 To avoid future lawsuits like Avery, 
insurance companies offering policies in Florida (and elsewhere) 
should offer two types of insurance policies—a “standard” policy and 
an “OEM” policy.143 Should the insurance companies decline to offer 
the two types of policies, the Florida Legislature should explore 
whether to enact legislation requiring Florida automobile insurance 
companies to offer consumers a choice. 
                                                                                                                      
 140. See infra App. B.  
 141. STEVEN J. SINKULA, CITIZENS FOR A SOUND ECONOMY FOUNDATION, CRASH 
REPLACEMENT PARTS: AFTER-MARKET OR NO MARKET? (Capitol Comment No. 199, 1998). 
 142. David Reich-Hale, State Farm Case Spurs Auto Policy Questions, NAT’L 
UNDERWRITER (PROPERTY & CASUALTY), Jan. 10, 2000, at 18 (quoting Todd Muller, Assoc. 
V.P., Consumer Affs. for the Indep. Ins. Agents of America).  
 143. Bob Crawford, the Florida Commissioner of Agriculture and Consumer Services, 
recently stated that the Avery decision, along with a Consumer Reports article, was a key 
factor in a “crackdown on inferior auto crash parts.” Press Release, Florida Dep’t of Agric. 
and Consumer Servs., Crawford Launches Crackdown on Inferior Auto Crash Parts (Apr. 
14, 2000), http://doacs.state.fl.us/press/04142000html (visited Oct. 7, 2000) [hereinafter 
DOACS, Crawford Crackdown]. The Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer 
Services, which regulates Florida automobile repair shops, sent a notice to these shops 
requiring that they “maintain documentation whenever an after-market crash part is 
installed on a vehicle.” Id. While this practice is consistent with Florida law relating to the 
use of non-OEM parts, some insurance industry personnel are concerned with the general 
tone of the Commissioner’s statement. See E-mail from Kirk Hansen, Director of Claims, 
Alliance of Am. Insurers, to Matthew Rearden (Apr. 17, 2000) (on file with author). Any 
attempt by insurance companies to force repair shops to use non-OEM parts will now 
trigger an investigation by the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services and a 
referral to the Florida Department of Insurance. See DOACS, Crawford Crackdown, supra. 
The bottom line is that Commissioner Crawford wants consumers to receive parts that are 
equal to OEM parts in terms of quality, fit, and performance. See E-mail from Terry 
McElroy, Florida Dep’t of Agric. and Consumer Servs., to Matthew Rearden (Apr. 17, 2000) 
(on file with author). This may simply be the starting point for a flood of similar 
regulations or “crackdowns” across the country which stem directly from Avery. 
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 The “standard” automobile policy would essentially be the same as 
the typical policy in existence today. But some wording changes may 
be advisable in the wake of Avery, such as altering the “pre-loss 
condition” guarantee language, which was the crux of the Avery 
plaintiffs’ argument.144 For example, insurance companies may 
promise to strive for preloss condition, but not go so far as to provide 
an absolute guarantee. Another option is to borrow CAPA’s language 
and promise to provide “functionally equivalent” parts.145 Consumer 
advocacy groups are likely to oppose these changes. Nevertheless, 
Avery has left insurance companies with few options. 
 Insurance companies should, however, also offer consumers an 
opportunity to purchase an “OEM” policy, at additional cost, which 
would consist of the “standard” policy plus an endorsement. This 
endorsement would state that the estimate and repair would consist 
of only OEM parts. The cost would be calculated on the fact that 
collision repair costs constitute roughly 38-50% of the cost of an 
insured’s automobile insurance policy premium.146 While actuaries 
would determine the exact amount each OEM policy would cost, the 
following is an example of how the new pricing could be developed. 
 The analysis begins with current insurance rates. On February 9, 
2000, three insurance companies in Florida provided quotes for an 
insurance policy for a forty-year-old male with a good driving 
record.147 The quotes were based on a 100/300/100 policy148 with $500 
deductibles for comprehensive and collision coverage. The companies 
offered rates for the 1999 Ford Taurus LX, 1998 Dodge Grand 
Caravan ES, and the 1997 Honda Accord LX, which were chosen 
because of their price diversity, commonality of usage, and different 
manufacturers. 
Automobile Insurance Premiums149  
      
 1999 Ford 
Taurus LX 
1998 Dodge 
Grand Caravan 
1997 Honda 
Accord LX 
State Farm $391.48 
 
$398.56 $382.72 
                                                                                                                      
 144. See Memorandum of State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. at 15, Avery (No. 88853). 
 145. Functionally Equivalent? LKQ? Similar? Equal?, CAPA NEWS, June 1999, at 5, 
available at http://www.capacertified.org (visited Jan. 15, 2001).  
 146. See Reich-Hale, supra note 21, at 16 (estimating 40-50%); Wald supra note 55, at 
C1 (estimating 38%).  
 147. See Telephone Interview with Cindy Ferarra, Office of State Farm Ins. Agent Jose 
Castillion, Daytona Beach, Fla. (Feb. 9, 2000); Telephone Interview with GEICO Ins. Co. 
Rep., GEICO 800 Call Center (Feb. 9, 2000); Telephone Interview with Progre ssive Ins. Co. 
Rep., Progressive 800 Call Center (Feb. 9, 2000).  
 148. Such a policy includes $100,000 of bodily injury coverage per person, $300,000 
aggregate bodily injury coverage per accident, and $100,000 property damage coverage. 
 149. See sources cited supra note 147.  
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Progressive $394.00 
 
$434.00 $436.00 
GEICO $387.20 
 
$428.40 $438.30 
Average Premium 
Per six months 
$390.89 $420.32 $419.00 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 For demonstration purposes, assume that 44% of the insurance 
premiums are allocated for repairs.150 The OEM premium can then be 
established with this five-step formula:151 
 
POLICY PRICING FORMULA 
 
“Standard” Policy Cost * Percent Attributable to Repair Damage 
(44%) = Standard Premium Attributable to Damage 
 
 
“Standard” Policy Cost * Percent Not Attributable to Repair Damage 
(56%) = Standard Premium Not Attributable to Damage 
 
 
100 * (Total OEM Parts Cost - Total Non-OEM Parts Cost)/Total 
OEM Parts Cost = Average Percentage Difference 
 
 
                                                                                                                      
 150. This estimation is based on policy costs which allocate, on average, 38-50% to 
cover damage repairs, as discussed earlier. See Reich-Hale, supra note 21 (estimating 40-
50%); Wald, supra note 55 (estimating 38%). This percentage will vary based on the 
portion of each insurance company’s policy that is dedicated to repairing vehicles.  
 151. If this formula were actually used, the cost difference between all parts (OEM less 
non-OEM) would have to be accounted for on each vehicle make. For the sake of 
simplifying explanation, only three major parts were used to calculate the average price 
difference between OEM and non-OEM parts. 
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(100% + Average Percentage Difference) * Standard Premium 
Attributable to Repair Damage = OEM Premium Attributable to 
Damage 
 
OEM Premium Attributable to Damage + Standard Premium Not 
Attributable to Repair Damage =  OEM Policy Cost 
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1999 Ford Taurus LX 
 
$390.89 * 56% = $218.90 (portion of standard policy not attributable 
to damage) 
$390.89 * 44% = $171.99 (portion of standard policy attributable to 
damage) 
OEM VS. NON-OEM PART COST DIFFERENCES152 
    
 OEM Part   
 
Non-OEM Part Price Difference 
Bumper $237.60 $190.00 $47.60 
 
Hood $268.67 
 
$159.00 $110.67 
Fender $136.29 $90.00 $46.29 
 
Total $642.56 $438.00 $204.56 
 
  
 
 Based on the above chart, Ford OEM parts are 31.8% 
($204.56/$642.56) more expensive than non-OEM parts. 
 
 
   1.318   *    $171.99  =   $226.68 
 (increased OEM cost)   (amount attributable     (OEM premium  
           to damage)         attributable to damage) 
 
 
   $226.68   +    $218.90  =   $445.58 
      (OEM premium    (amount of premium not      (OEM premium) 
  attributable to damage)     attributable to damage) 
 
   
 The estimated cost of an OEM policy for a 1999 Ford Taurus LX 
would be $54.69 ($445.58 - $390.89) more than a standard policy for 
a six-month period. Annually, insureds defined in this example 
would pay an additional $109.38 for an OEM policy. 
 
                                                                                                                      
 152.  See AAI, CURRENT COSTS, supra note 137. 
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1998 Dodge Grand Caravan ES 
 
$420.32 * 56% = $235.38 (portion of standard policy not attributable 
to damage) 
$420.32 * 44% = $184.94 (portion of standard policy attributable to 
damage) 
OEM VS. NON-OEM PART COST DIFFERENCES153 
 OEM Part   
 
Non-OEM Part Price Difference 
Bumper $345.00 $256.00 $89.00 
 
Hood $295.00 
 
$168.00 $127.00 
Fender $132.00 $91.00 $41.00 
 
Total $772.00 $515.00 $257.00 
 
 
 
 Based on the above chart, Dodge OEM parts are 33.3% ($257.00/ 
$772.00) more expensive than non-OEM parts. 
 
 
   1.333   *     $184.94  =  $246.53 
 (increased OEM cost)   (amount attributable     (OEM premium  
           to damage)         attributable to damage) 
 
 
   $246.53  +    $235.38  =  $481.91 
      (OEM premium    (amount of premium not      (OEM premium) 
  attributable to damage)     attributable to damage) 
 
 
 The estimated cost of an OEM policy for a 1998 Dodge Grand 
Caravan ES would be $61.59 ($481.91 - $420.32) more than a 
standard policy. 
                                                                                                                      
 153.  See id. 
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1997 Honda Accord LX 
 
$419.00 * 56% = $234.64 (portion of standard policy not attributable 
to damage) 
$419.00 * 44% = $184.36 (portion of standard policy attributable to 
damage) 
OEM vs. Non-OEM Part Cost Differences154 
 OEM Part   
 
Non-OEM Part Price Difference 
Bumper $188.07 $132.00 $56.07 
 
Hood $332.47 
 
$124.00 $208.47 
Fender $163.54 $52.00 $111.54 
 
Total $684.08 $308.00 $376.08 
 
 
  
Based on the above chart, Honda OEM parts are 55% ($376.08/ 
$684.08) more expensive than non-OEM parts. 
 
 
   1.55    *   $184.36  =   $285.76 
 (increased OEM cost)   (amount attributable     (OEM premium  
           to damage)         attributable to damage) 
 
 
   $285.76  +   $234.64  =  $520.40 
      (OEM premium    (amount of premium not      (OEM premium) 
  attributable to damage)     attributable to damage) 
 
 
 The estimated cost of an OEM policy for a 1997 Honda Accord LX 
would be $101.40 ($520.40 - $419.00) more than a standard policy. 
 
 As the above examples illustrate, the “standard” policy in Florida 
would generally be less expensive than the “OEM” policy.155 Of 
course, this analysis is cursory and any pricing change or additional 
                                                                                                                      
 154. See id. 
 155. For a chart showing the difference in policy prices, see infra app. C.  
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policy type would have to be developed by insurance actuaries. Their 
calculations would have to account for predicted automobile 
accidents, estimated repair costs for the upcoming year, and the 
possibility that a monopoly of OEM parts in the repair market could 
trigger increased parts costs. This last factor is especially important 
due to favorable pricing on non-OEM parts, as shown in Appendix B, 
“Cost History Comparison: OEM vs. Competitive Replacement 
Parts.”156 Nonetheless, the above analysis illustrates the lower costs 
associated with “standard” policies. 
 The limited analysis shows a range of savings between $54.69 and 
$101.40 per six months for purchasing the “standard” policy. If this 
analysis were expanded to include parts prices for an entire vehicle, 
the increase in an “OEM” policy price would continue to grow. Since 
non-OEM parts are not made for each component of the vehicles, 
some OEM parts must be used to reconstruct any car. Based on the 
recent study by the AAI, the OEM parts cost, on average, is 60% 
greater than the non-OEM parts cost.157 In referring to this two-
policy system, one consumer aptly stated, “Those who want the best 
should be willing to pay for the best and the rest of us should not 
have to subsidize them.”158  
 As previously mentioned, a two-policy system would require 
insurance companies, financial analysts, and actuaries to complete a 
more detailed formulation of the “OEM” policies. Each vehicle make 
and model should be scrutinized to find the cost difference between 
repairing it with OEM or non-OEM parts. When this is completed, a 
formula, similar to the one above, would be applied to find the cost of 
“OEM” policies. While this tabulation may cost a significant amount 
of money in research and development, it should be cost effective for 
both insurance companies and insurance consumers in the long 
run.159 
 Additionally, insurance companies and automobile repair shops 
would have to ensure that the parts used are in conformity with the 
various state regulations regarding the use of non-OEM parts.160 
Many of the fifty states currently have some laws concerning the use 
of non-OEM parts.161 These laws may require a written estimate 
                                                                                                                      
 156. Infra app. B. 
 157. See AAI, COST HISTORY, supra note 139; infra app. B. 
 158. Letter from W. Paul Mandt, to Nat’l Underwriter (Nov. 29, 1999), at 
http://www.nunews.com/archives/pc_archive/1999/p11-29/48letters.asp (visited Oct. 16, 
2000). 
 159. See Memorandum of State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. at 5, Avery (No. 88853). 
 160. See ALLIANCE OF AM. INSURERS, STATE LAW GOVERNING AFTERMARKET PARTS 
(1999) (on file with author); Reich-Hale, supra note 21, at 18. 
 161. See ALA. CODE § 32-17A-1 to -3 (2000); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 20-461 (2000); ARK. 
CODE ANN. §§ 4-90-301, -302, -307 (Michie 1999); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 9875.1 (West 
2000); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 10-3-1301 to -1305 (1999); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-355 (2000); 
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disclosure statement regarding non-OEM parts, written consent by 
the insured for use of non-OEM parts, warranty of non-OEM parts by 
the insurance company, or a limitation on the type of parts used. For 
example, Florida law requires disclosure in all instances where non-
OEM parts are used in preparing an estimate for repairs.162 
 While those statutory requirements would remain even with the 
development of an “OEM” policy, the issuance of an “OEM” policy 
would eliminate some of the disclosures that must be made with non-
OEM parts. In some instances, the mandatory use of non -OEM parts 
in insurance companies’ “standard” policies could conflict with those 
statutory requirements. That possibility should be explored before 
implementation. 
 The sale and distribution of these two policies must also be 
explored. Insurance agents would have to adjust to the “OEM” 
alternative. However, what some may view as a potential pitfall 
could be a marketing department’s dream. The first few companies to 
implement the two-policy system would give their agents an 
opportunity to tap into a market of consumers who want only 
premium parts for their vehicles. 
 There is, nonetheless, a very real possibility that the two-policy 
system would be rejected by insurance consumers. Most consumers 
generally want to pay the least amount of money for the best product 
or service. In the insurance world, this translates into the insurance 
consumer who desires to pay a low insurance rate and expects his 
vehicle to be repaired with what he conceives as the best repair 
parts—OEM parts. The potential pitfall lies in the unlikely 
                                                                                                                      
FLA. STAT. § 501.33 (2000); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-6-5 (2000); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 437B-1, -
13, -15 (1999); IDAHO CODE §§ 41-1328B to -1328D (2000); 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/155.29 
(West 2000); IND. CODE. § 27-4-1.5-8 (2000); IOWA CODE §§ 507B.4, 321.1 (1999); KAN. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 50-660, -662 (1999); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:2424 (West 1999); MD. CODE 
ANN., COM. LAW § 14-2302 (1999); MASS. GEN. LAWS, ch. 90, § 34R (2000); MICH. COMP. 
LAWS § 257.1362 (2000); MINN. STAT. §§ 72A.201, 72B.091 (2000); MISS. CODE ANN. § 63-
27-1, -3, -5 (1999); MO. REV. STAT. § 407.295 (1999); NEB. ADMIN. CODE tit. 210, §§ 45-002, 
-006 (2000); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 407-D:2 (1999); N.J. ADMIN. CODE, tit. 11, § 11:2-17.3 
(2000); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 11, § 216.7 (2000); N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 11, r. 
4.0425-.0427 (July 2000); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.81 (West 2000); OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, 
§ 955 (1999); OR. REV. STAT. § 746.292 (1999); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-10.2-1, -2 (1999); S.D. 
CODIFIED LAWS § 58-33-71 (Michie 2000); TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. tit. 0780, ch. 1-59-.04 
(2000); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 5.07-1 (West 1999); UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-22-319 (2000); 
VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-510 (Michie 2000); W. VA. CODE § 46A-6B-1 to -6 (2000); WIS. STAT. 
§ 632.38 (2000); WYO. ADMIN. R. & REGS. ch. 19, § 7 (2000).  
 162. See FLA. STAT. § 501.33 (2000). The disclosure must contain the following 
information in a font type no smaller than 10 point:  
This estimate has been prepared based on the use of crash parts supplied by a 
source other than the manufacturer of your motor vehicle. The aftermarket 
crash parts used in the preparation of this estimate are warranted by the 
manufacturer or distributor of such parts rather than the manufacturer of your 
vehicle. 
Id. 
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possibility that all consumers would reject the “OEM” policy because 
of its increased price. If so, the resources expended in developing this 
policy would be spent in vain. However, the companies with these 
two-policy systems would avoid lawsuits like Avery because of the 
upfront choice. The first company to institute this type of system 
would need to take this financial risk.  
 Experimenting with the two policy types on several of the most 
popular vehicles would possibly reduce this risk. Moreover, this fear 
could be minimized simply by observing consumer trends. Certain 
people only purchase “name brand” products, while others opt for 
generic items. Furthermore, consumers who prefer premium parts 
will pay for them, and others will select the “standard” policy. 
 Once all the bugs are worked out, this two-policy system would 
benefit both the insurers and the insureds. First, offering two policies 
will avoid claims like those in Avery. Insurance companies will be 
able to defend such suits on the basis that the insureds agreed to 
have non-OEM parts installed on their cars when they chose the 
“standard” policy. For this defense to be asserted, it will nevertheless 
be necessary to change the language in the policies from 
guaranteeing “like kind and quality” parts to language which will 
better reflect the policy the insured chose.163 Finally, John Rollins, an 
actuary at Florida Farm Bureau Insurance, succinctly summed up 
the ramifications of Avery when he stated “it is clear that one side 
benefit of all of this is that it will provide incentive for companies to 
reexamine [the] products they provide and the consumer friendliness 
of the products.”164  
VI.   CONCLUSION 
 Even if overturned, Avery has changed the face of automobile 
insurance.165 On the one hand, Avery will cause insurance companies 
to reevaluate their use of non-OEM parts. On the other hand, Avery 
may cause a substantial increase in insurance premiums to offset the 
cost of more expensive OEM parts. Whether on the initiative of 
insurance companies or the Florida Legislature, the use of two types 
of policies may be the answer to the huge question facing the 
automobile insurance industry—What do we do in the wake of 
Avery?—as well as a long-term win-win solution for consumers. 
Consumers who are willing to have their automobiles repaired with 
non-OEM parts can continue to enjoy lower premiums while those 
                                                                                                                      
 163. Avery v. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co., No. 97-L-114, 1999 WL 1022134, at *2 (Ill. 
Cir. Ct. Oct. 8, 1999), appeal docketed, No. 5-99-0830 (Ill. App. Ct. Dec. 21, 1999). 
 164. Reich-Hale, supra note 142, at 18. 
 165. See id. 
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who are willing to pay higher insurance rates can ensure their 
automobiles are repaired with OEM parts.  
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APPENDIX A 
Comparison of Current Costs: 
OEM vs. Competitive Replacement Parts166 
 
 
                                                                                                                      
 166. See AAI, CURRENT COSTS, supra note 137. 
   Bumper ($) Hood ($) Fender ($) 
Make 
Model  
Model 
Years 
OEM Non-
OEM 
OEM Non-
OEM 
OEM Non-
OEM 
Chevrolet 
Cavalier 
1995-99 198.00 137.00 338.00 196.00 146.00 87.00 
Chevrolet 
Lumina 
1995-99 302.00 209.00 545.00 279.00 272.00 148.00 
Chrysler  
Cirrus 
1995-98 535.00 247.00 295.00 159.00 305.00 95.00 
Dodge  
Caravan 
1996-98 345.00 256.00 295.00 168.00 132.00 91.00 
Ford  
Mustang 
1994-98 364.10 290.00 529.28 326.00 245.16 117.00 
Ford Escort 1997-99 250.22 140.00 143.85 97.00 129.30 50.00 
Ford 
Taurus 
1996-99 237.60 190.00 268.67 159.00 136.29 90.00 
Honda  
Accord 
1996-97 188.07 132.00 332.47 124.00 163.54 52.00 
Mazda 626 1993-95 265.75 180.00 476.50 180.00 138.45 96.00 
Nissan  
Altima 
1994-97 145.40 116.00 345.62 153.00 183.29 83.00 
Toyota  
Camry 
1997-99 159.52 121.00 282.48 252.00 194.84 189.00 
Chevrolet 
1500 PU 
1988-99 202.38 159.00 299.00 128.00 149.00 77.00 
Ford  
F150 PU 
1997-98 235.12 190.00 416.66 260.00 160.02 105.00 
Ford  
Explorer 
1995-97 371.58 291.00 350.00 144.00 192.00 79.00 
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APPENDIX B 
Cost History Comparison: 
OEM vs. Competitive Replacement Parts167 
 
Make 
Model 
Model 
Year 
1994 
 
1995 
 
1996 1997 1998 1999 
Pontiac Grand  
Prix Coupe 
1991-96       
 OEM 
Fender 
 309.00 324.00 354.00 364.00 368.00 275.00 
 Non-OEM 
Fender  
 171.00 171.00 131.00 124.00 132.00 132.00 
Toyota Camry 1989-95       
 OEM 
Fender  
 265.79 259.96 143.88 143.88 143.88 146.47 
 Non-OEM 
Fender  
 209.00 104.00 60.00 63.00 77.00 56.00 
Chevrolet  
Caprice 
1991-96       
 OEM 
Fender 
 267.00 226.00 238.00 248.00 248.00 248.00 
 Non-OEM 
Fender  
 186.00 148.00 153.00 140.00 120.00 102.00 
Ford  
Thunderbird 
1989-95       
 OEM 
Fender  
 205.00 211.15 211.00 211.15 222.76 199.20 
 Non-OEM 
Fender  
 166.00 166.00 166.00 166.00 166.00 121.00 
Buick Century 1982-96       
 OEM 
Fender  
 122.67 129.00 136.00 141.00 141.00 141.00 
 Non-OEM 
Fender  
 108.00 108.00 108.00 113.00 113.00 89.00 
Ford Escort  1991-96       
 OEM 
Fender 
 171.45 180.02 180.02 121.55 190.61 190.60 
 Non-OEM 
Fender  
 79.00 79.00 65.00 68.00 79.00 51.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                      
 167. See AAI, COST HISTORY, supra note 139. 
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APPENDIX C 
Comparison of Standard Policy Price and OEM Policy Price168 
 
 Average 
 Standard 
 Policy Price 
Estimated 
OEM  
Policy Price 
Difference in 
Price 
1999 Ford 
Taurus LX 
$390.89 $445.58 $54.69 
1998 Dodge 
Grand  
Caravan ES 
$420.32 $481.91 $61.59 
1997 Honda 
Accord 
$419.00 $520.40 $101.40 
 
 
                                                                                                                      
 168. See AAI, CURRENT COSTS, supra note 137; see also supra text accompanying notes 
153-55.  
